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We develop a new automated reasoning technique for the situation calculus that can
handle a class of queries containing universal quantiﬁcation over situation terms. Although
such queries arise naturally in many important reasoning tasks, they are diﬃcult to
automate in the situation calculus due to the presence of a second-order induction axiom.
We show how to reduce queries about property persistence, a common type of universally-
quantiﬁed query, to an equivalent form that does not quantify over situations and so is
amenable to existing reasoning techniques. Our algorithm replaces induction with a meta-
level ﬁxpoint calculation; crucially, this calculation uses only ﬁrst-order reasoning with a
limited set of axioms. The result is a powerful new tool for verifying sophisticated domain
properties in the situation calculus.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The situation calculus is one of the most popular and inﬂuential AI formalisms for reasoning about action and change,
having found application in a wide variety of both theoretical and practical works [5,6,9,26,27,30]. A major contributor
to the success of the formalism is that it combines a powerful modelling language built on ﬁrst-order logic with easily
implementable techniques for effective automated reasoning.
A key challenge when working with the situation calculus is managing this balance between expressivity and effective-
ness. An induction axiom is used to deﬁne the structure of situation terms, so answering arbitrary queries requires reasoning
in second-order logic. While certain special cases are known to be decidable [31], such reasoning is prohibitively expensive
in general [24].
If queries are restricted to certain syntactic forms, it is possible to obtain much more effective reasoning procedures –
for example, queries restricted to existential quantiﬁcation over situations can be answered using only ﬁrst-order logic [23],
while queries containing only ground situation terms permit special-purpose techniques such as regression [26].
However, there are many important reasoning tasks that require universal quantiﬁcation over situations, for which the
situation calculus currently offers no effective reasoning tools. One simple example is the problem of goal impossibility –
establishing that all possible situations fail to satisfy a goal. In this paper we study a subset of universally-quantiﬁed queries
which we refer to as property persistence queries: under a particular situation calculus theory D, and given some formula φ
and situation σ , determine whether φ will hold in all situations in the future of σ :
D | ∀s: σ  s → φ[s]
The need for second-order logic has traditionally limited automated reasoning about such queries. We introduce a new
approach to property persistence that is similar in spirit to the standard regression operator, by deﬁning a meta-level
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +613 8344 1399; fax: +613 9348 1184.
E-mail addresses: rfk@csse.unimelb.edu.au (R.F. Kelly), adrianrp@unimelb.edu.au (A.R. Pearce).0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.05.003
866 R.F. Kelly, A.R. Pearce / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 865–888operator PD such that φ persists at σ if and only if PD(φ) holds at σ . We term the resulting formula the persistence
condition of φ and show how to calculate it as a ﬁxpoint of applications of an operator based on regression; crucially, this
calculation requires only ﬁrst-order logic and a limited set of axioms. The persistence condition is also guaranteed to be in
a form amenable to existing automated reasoning techniques.
Importantly, our results do not require restrictions on the domain theory D – they are generally applicable to the full
ﬁrst-order situation calculus, and are based purely on standard ﬁrst-order reasoning techniques.
The result is a powerful new technique for exploring sophisticated domain properties in the situation calculus. It allows
some second-order aspects of the theory to be “factored out” and handled using a special-purpose algorithm. The technique
is always sound, and we show that it is complete for important standard variants of the situation calculus. Perhaps most
importantly, it builds upon and integrates well with standard techniques for effective automated reasoning, so our technique
is directly applicable to existing theories and systems based on the situation calculus.
A preliminary version of this paper has previously appeared as [15]; this revised edition includes extended and additional
proofs, a more comprehensive discussion of the termination properties of our algorithm, and a detailed example of how the
persistence condition can be used to reason about goal impossibility – a deceptively simple task which is nonetheless
beyond the reach of existing reasoning techniques.
The paper now proceeds with a brief review of the situation calculus, before formally deﬁning the persistence condition
and establishing its effectiveness as a reasoning tool. Readers familiar with the situation calculus are encouraged to review
the background material in Sections 2 and 4, as we make several small modiﬁcations to the standard notation that greatly
simplify the development of our approach: the unique names axioms Duna are incorporated into a general background
theory Dbg ; the Poss ﬂuent is subsumed by a general class of action description predicates deﬁned in Dad; we parameterise
the “future situations” predicate s s′ to assert that all intermediate actions satisfy a given predicate using s <α s′; and we
use the single-step variant of the regression operator, with corresponding deﬁnitions of regressable formulae.
2. The situation calculus
The situation calculus is a powerful formalism for describing and reasoning about dynamic worlds. It was ﬁrst introduced
by McCarthy and Hayes [22] and has since been signiﬁcantly expanded and formalised [23,26]. We use the particular variant
due to Reiter et al. at the University of Toronto, sometimes called the “Toronto school” or “situations-as-histories” version.
The formalisation below is based on the standard deﬁnitions from [16,23,25], with some simple modiﬁcations.
The language Lsitcalc of the situation calculus is a many-sorted language of second-order logic with equality, containing
the following disjoint sorts:
• Action terms denote individual instantaneous events that can cause the state of the world to change;
• Situation terms are histories of the actions that have occurred in the world, with the initial situation represented by S0
and successive situations built using the function do : Action× Situation→ Situation;
• Object terms represent any other object in the domain.
Fluents are predicates representing properties of the world that may change between situations, and so take a situation
term as their ﬁnal argument. Predicates and functions that do not take a situation term are called rigid. We use the term
primitive ﬂuent to describe ﬂuents that are directly affected by actions, rather than being deﬁned in terms of other ﬂuents.
No functions other than S0 and do produce values of sort Situation. For the sake of clarity we will not consider functional
ﬂuents in this paper; this is a common simplifying assumption in the situation calculus literature and does not result in a
loss of generality.
Lsitcalc contains the standard alphabet of logical connectives, constants  and ⊥, countably inﬁnitely many variables of
each sort, countably inﬁnitely many predicates of each arity, etc.; for a complete deﬁnition, consult the foundational paper
by Pirri and Reiter [23]. We follow standard naming conventions for the situation calculus: upper-case roman names indicate
constants; lower-case roman names indicate variables; Greek characters indicate meta-variables or formula templates. All
axioms universally close over their free variables at outermost scope. The notation t¯ indicates a vector of terms of context-
appropriate arity and type. The connectives ∧, ¬, ∃ are taken as primitive, with ∨, →, ≡, ∀ deﬁned in the usual manner.
Complex properties of the state of the world are represented using uniform formulae. These are basically logical combi-
nations of ﬂuents referring to a common situation term.
Deﬁnition 1 (Uniform formulae). Let σ be a ﬁxed situation term, Ri an arbitrary rigid predicate, Fi an arbitrary primitive
ﬂuent predicate, τi an arbitrary term that is not of sort Situation, and xi an arbitrary variable that is not of sort Situation.
Then the formulae uniform in σ are the smallest set of syntactically-valid formulae satisfying:
φ ::= Fi(τ¯i,σ ) | Ri(τ¯i) | τi = τ j | φi ∧ φ j | ¬φ | ∃xi: φ
We will call a formula uniform if it is uniform in some situation. The important aspect of this deﬁnition is that the
formula refers to no situation other than σ , which appears as the ﬁnal argument of all ﬂuents in the formula. In particular,
uniform formulae cannot quantify over situations or compare situation terms, and cannot contain non-primitive ﬂuents.
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formula with the particular situation s′ inserted into all its ﬂuents, replacing whatever situation term was previously there.
Note that this is simply a syntactic shorthand designed to keep the presentation clean and readable – it is not an operation
from the logic itself.
The dynamics of a particular domain are captured by a set of sentences called a basic action theory. Queries about the
behaviour of the world are posed as logical entailment queries relative to this theory.
Deﬁnition 2 (Basic action theory). A basic action theory, denoted D, is a set of situation calculus sentences (of the speciﬁc
syntactic form outlined below) describing a particular dynamic world. It consists of the following disjoint sets: the founda-
tional axioms of the situation calculus (Σ ); action description axioms deﬁning various aspects of action performance, such
as preconditions (Dad); successor state axioms describing how primitive ﬂuents change between situations (Dssa); axioms
describing the value of primitive ﬂuents in the initial situation (DS0 ); and axioms describing the static background facts of
the domain (Dbg ):
D = Σ ∪ Dad ∪ Dssa ∪ DS0 ∪ Dbg
These axioms must satisfy some simple consistency criteria in order to constitute a valid domain description [23]. This
is a straightforward modiﬁcation of the standard deﬁnition of a basic action theory, intended to simplify the details of our
forthcoming development.
The axiom set DS0 is a collection of sentences uniform in S0 that describe the initial state of the world, while the set
Dbg contains all the situation-independent facts about the domain. Standard notation includes situation-independent facts
in DS0 , but our upcoming deﬁnitions require that they be separate. Dbg includes the standard unique names axioms for
actions [23].
The axiom set Dssa contains one successor state axiom for each primitive ﬂuent in the domain, providing a monotonic
solution to the frame problem for that ﬂuent. They have the following form, where Φ is uniform in s:
F
(
x¯,do(a, s)
)≡ ΦF (x¯,a, s)
The axiom set Dad deﬁnes ﬂuents that describe various aspects of the performance of an action, which we call action
description predicates. For each such predicate ADP(x¯,a, s) the set Dad contains a single axiom of the following form, where
ΠADP is uniform in s:
ADP(x¯,a, s) ≡ ΠADP(x¯,a, s)
The canonical example of an action description predicate is the precondition predicate Poss(a, s), which indicates whether
it is possible to perform an action in a given situation. In principle there can be any number of predicates or functions
deﬁned in a similar way – a common example is the function SR used to axiomatise sensing actions in [29]. We will
henceforth use the meta-predicate α to denote an arbitrary action description predicate.
Note that this is a departure from the standard notion, where a separate axiom speciﬁes the preconditions for each
function of sort Action [23]. The single-axiom approach used here embodies a domain closure assumption on the Action
sort, and is necessary when reasoning about formulae that universally quantify over actions [28,34].
We will sometimes write the deﬁnition of an action description predicate in terms of other previously-deﬁned action
description predicates. This is purely a notational convenience; the deﬁnitions in Dad must use primitive ﬂuents only.
The foundational axioms Σ ensure that situations form a branching-time account of the world state. There is a distin-
guished situation term S0 called the initial situation, and situations in general form a tree structure with S0 at the root and
do(a, s) constructing the situation that results from performing action a in situation s. We abbreviate the performance of
several successive actions by writing:
do
([a1 . . .an], s) def= do(an,do(. . . ,do(a1, s)))
The relation s s′ indicates that s′ is in the future of s:
¬(s S0)
s do(a, s′)≡ s  s′
Here s  s′ is the standard abbreviation for s s′ ∨ s = s′ . This notation for “in the future of” can be extended to consider
only those futures in which all actions satisfy a particular action description predicate. We include a relation <α for each
action description predicate α, with the following deﬁnitions:
¬(s <α S0)
s <α do
(
a, s′
)≡ sα s′ ∧ α(a, s′)
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between s and s′ were actually possible; this is equivalent to the < operator of Pirri and Reiter [23]. Note that we suppress
the action and situation arguments of the action description predicate in order to simplify the presentation.
Finally, a second-order induction axiom is used to assert that all situations must be constructed by performing a ﬁnite
sequence of actions:
∀P : [P (S0) ∧ ∀s,a: (P (s) → P(do(a, s)))]→ ∀s: P (s)
This axiom is the only second-order sentence in a basic action theory, and is vital to the proper semantics of statements
that universally quantify over situation terms [24].
3. Property persistence queries
With this notation in hand, let us now formally deﬁne the kinds of query that are of interest in this paper. Given some
uniform formula φ and situation σ , a property persistence query asks whether φ will hold in all situations in the future of σ :
D | ∀s: σ  s → φ[s]
More generally, one may wish to limit the futures under consideration to those brought about by actions satisfying a
certain predicate α, which is easily accomplished using the α relation. We thus have the following deﬁnition of a property
persistence query:
Deﬁnition 3 (Property persistence query). Let φ be a uniform formula, α an action description predicate, and σ a situation
term. Then a property persistence query is a query of the form:
D | ∀s: σ α s → φ[s]
If the query contains free variables, we treat them as universally quantiﬁed at outermost scope.
In words, a persistence query states that “φ holds in σ , and assuming all subsequent actions satisfy α, φ will continue to
hold”. For succinctness we will henceforth describe this as “φ persists under α”. Such queries are involved in many useful
reasoning tasks; the following are a small selection:
Goal impossibility. Given a goal G , establish that there is no legal situation in which that goal is achieved:
D | ∀s: S0 Poss s → ¬G(s)
Goal futility. Given a goal G and situation σ , establish that the goal cannot be achieved in any legal future of σ :
D | ∀s: σ Poss s → ¬G(s)
Note how this differs from goal impossibility: while the goal may have initially been achievable, subsequent actions have
rendered the goal unachievable. Detecting and avoiding such situations could be a very important task.
Checking state constraints. Given a state constraint SC, show that the constraint holds in every legal situation:
D | ∀s: S0 Poss s → SC(s)
This can be seen as a variant of goal impossibility, by showing that the constraint can never be violated.
Need for cooperation. Given an agent agt , goal G and situation σ , establish that no sequence of actions performed by that
agent only can achieve the goal. Suppose we deﬁne MyAction to identify the agent’s own actions:
MyAction(a, s)
def= actor(a) = agt
Then the appropriate query is:
D | ∀s: σ MyAction s → ¬G(s)
If this is the case, the agent will need to seek cooperation from another agent in order to achieve its goal.
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other agents can perform “hidden” actions that it is unable to observe. To reason correctly in such asynchronous domains,
the agent must take into account arbitrarily-long sequences of hidden actions [14,32].
For example, suppose an agent can only observe actions if they occur in the same room as it and the lights are on:
Hidden(a, s)
def= InSameRoom(actor(a),agt, s)∧ LightsOn(s)
Intuitively, to establish that it knows φ the agent must establish that φ cannot become false through a sequence of
hidden actions:
D | ∀s: σ Hidden s → φ[s]
Here σ Hidden s denotes that a sequence of possible, but hidden, actions was performed by other agents between σ and s.
The “gold thief” domain. As a more detailed example, which we will revisit in Section 7, consider a domain in which a
thief may try to steal some gold from a safe. There is a light in the room, and a security camera that will detect the thief’s
actions as long as the light is on. The safe can be open or closed, but the gold can only be stolen if the safe is open. It is
possible for the thief to crack the safe and force it open, but only if the light is on.
The actions in this domain are takeGold, crackSafe and toggleLight, the primitive ﬂuents are SafeOpen, LightOn and Stolen,
and the action description predicates include the standard Poss(a, s) and a custom predicate Undet(a, s) indicating that
action a would not be detected by the security camera. The complete axioms can be found in Appendix B.
As the owners of the gold, we would like to ensure that the thief cannot steal it. Unfortunately this is not possible, as
nothing prevents him from simply cracking the safe and taking the gold. We can, however, ensure that the thief cannot
steal the gold undetected. Formally, we want to establish that “no sequence of undetected actions results in the gold being
stolen”:
D | ∀s: S0 Undet s → ¬Stolen(s) (1)
Intuitively, this will be the case as long as the gold is not already stolen, and either the light is on (so the thief’s actions
will be detected) or the safe is closed (so the thief must switch on the light to crack it):
Dbg ∪ DS0 | ¬Stolen(S0) ∧
[¬SafeOpen(S0) ∨ LightOn(S0)] (2)
A manual proof that (1) iff (2) is straightforward, but it is beyond the reach of the standard automated reasoning tools of
the situation calculus. The diﬃculty, as we shall explore in the next section, stems from the use of a second-order induction
axiom to deﬁne the set of all situations.
4. Effective reasoning
An important feature of the situation calculus is the existence of effective reasoning procedures for certain types of
query. In the general case, answering a query about a basic action theory D is a theorem-proving task in second-order logic
(denoted SOL) due to the induction axiom:
D |SOL ψ
This is clearly problematic for effective automated reasoning. Fortunately, restricting the syntactic form of queries can
allow us to discard some axioms from D and make automated reasoning easier.
A core result of Pirri and Reiter [23] is that if a query performs only existential quantiﬁcation over situations, then it can
be answered without the induction axiom (denoted I) and thus using only ﬁrst-order logic (FOL):
D |SOL ∃s: ψ(s)
iff
D − {I} |FOL ∃s: ψ(s)
While this is a substantial improvement over requiring a second-order theorem prover, it is still far from an effective
technique. Effective reasoning requires that the set of axioms be reduced as much as possible.
In their work on state constraints, Lin and Reiter [19] show how to reduce the task of verifying a state constraint to a
reasoning task we call static domain reasoning, where only the background axioms need to be considered:
Dbg |FOL ∀s: φ[s]
Since the axioms in Dbg do not mention situation terms, the leading quantiﬁcation in such queries has no effect – φ
will hold for all s if and only if it holds for some s. This is an important result because it is usually not valid to drop the
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in some cases.
Simpler still are queries uniform in the initial situation, which can be answered using only ﬁrst-order logic and a limited
set of axioms:
D |SOL φ[S0]
iff
DS0 ∪ Dbg |FOL φ[S0]
We call such reasoning initial situation reasoning. Since the axioms DS0 ∪ Dbg often satisfy the closed-world assumption,
provers such as Prolog can be employed to handle this type of query quite effectively.
While few useful queries happen to precisely match these restricted forms, it is possible to answer quite broad classes
of query by transforming them into such a form. This insight is at the heart of the principle tool for effective reasoning in
the situation calculus: regression.
4.1. Regression
The regression meta-operator RD is a syntactic manipulation that encodes the preconditions and effects of actions into
the query itself, meaning fewer axioms are needed for the ﬁnal reasoning task [23,26]. The idea is to reduce a query about
some future situation to a query about the initial situation only, which is much easier to answer.
There are two styles of regression operator commonly deﬁned in the literature: the single-pass operator as deﬁned
in [23] which reduces to S0 in a single application, and the single-step operator as deﬁned in [29] which operates one
action at a time. We use the single-step variant as it is the more powerful of the two; the single-pass operator can only be
applied to situations rooted at S0, while the single-step operator can handle formulae containing situation variables.
Regression is only deﬁned for formulae that are regressable:
Deﬁnition 4 (Regressable formulae). Let σi be an arbitrary situation term, xi an arbitrary variable not of sort Situation, τi
an arbitrary term not of sort Situation, ai an arbitrary term of sort Action, Ri an arbitrary rigid predicate, Fi an arbitrary
primitive ﬂuent predicate, and αi an arbitrary action description predicate. Then the regressable formulae are the smallest
set of syntactically-valid formulae satisfying:
ϕ ::= Fi(τ¯i,σi) | αi(τ¯i,ai,σi) | Ri(τ¯i) | τi = τ j | ¬ϕ | ϕi ∧ ϕ j | ∃xi: ϕ
Regressable formulae are more general than uniform formulae. In particular, they can contain action description predi-
cates and may mention different situation terms. They cannot, however, quantify over situation terms or compare situations
using the  predicate. Note also that our deﬁnition is more general than that of [23], where the single-pass regression
operator is used.
The regression operator is deﬁned using a series of regression rules such as those shown below, mirroring the structure
of regressable formulae:
Deﬁnition 5 (Regression operator). Let Ri be an arbitrary rigid predicate, αi be an arbitrary action description predicate with
axiom αi(ν¯,a, s) ≡ Πα(ν¯,a, s) in Dad , Fi be an arbitrary primitive ﬂuent with axiom Fi(x¯,do(a, s)) ≡ ΦFi (x¯,a, s) in Dssa , τi
be an arbitrary term not of sort Situation, si be an arbitrary variable of sort Situation, and ai be an arbitrary term of sort
Action. Then the regression of φ, denoted RD(φ), is deﬁned according to the following structural rules:
RD(ϕi ∧ ϕ j) def= RD(ϕi) ∧ RD(ϕ j)
RD(∃xi: ϕ) def= ∃xi: RD(ϕ)
RD(¬ϕi) def= ¬RD(ϕi)
RD
(
αi(τ¯i,ai,σi)
) def= RD(Πα(τ¯i,ai,σi))
RD
(
Fi
(
τ¯i,do(ai,σi)
)) def= ΦFi (τ¯i,ai,σi)
RD
(
Fi(τ¯i, si)
) def= Fi(τ¯i, si)
RD
(
Fi(τ¯i, S0)
) def= Fi(τ¯i, S0)
RD(τi = τ j) def= τi = τ j
RD
(
Ri(τ¯i)
) def= Ri(τ¯i)
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from Dad and primitive ﬂuents with the RHS of their successor state axioms from Dssa , “unwinding” a single action from
each do(a, σ ) situation term in the query. If the situation term is not constructed using do, it is left unchanged.
Let us brieﬂy state some important properties of the regression operator. First, and most importantly, it preserves equiv-
alence of formulae:
Proposition 1. For ϕ a regressable formula, D | ϕ ≡ RD(ϕ).
Proof. By Pirri and Reiter [23, Theorem 2]. 
Any formula uniform in do(a, s) is regressable, and the resulting formula will always be uniform in s:
Proposition 2. For φ uniform in do(a, s), RD(φ) is uniform in s.
Proof. By induction on the structure of regressable formulae. 
Let R∗D denote repeated applications of RD until the formula remains unchanged. Such applications can transform a
query about some future situation into a query about the initial situation only:
Proposition 3. For φ uniform in do([a1 . . .an], S0), R∗D(φ) is uniform in S0 .
Proof. By Pirri and Reiter [23, Theorem 3, part 1]. 
This last property is key to effective reasoning in the situation calculus, as it allows one to answer the projection problem.
To determine whether φ holds in a given future situation, it suﬃces to determine whether R∗D(φ) holds in the initial
situation:
Proposition 4. For φ uniform in do([a1 . . .an], S0):
D | φ iff DS0 ∪ Dbg | R∗D(φ).
Proof. By Pirri and Reiter [23, Theorem 3, part 2]. 
The regressed form is usually easier to answer, as it requires only the initial state axioms and background theory. The
axioms Dad and Dssa are essentially “compiled into the query” by the R∗D operator. While an eﬃciency gain is not guar-
anteed, regression has proven a very effective technique in practice [17,23], particularly when combined with techniques to
limit the resulting increase in query size [33].
Unfortunately, this powerful technique cannot be applied to formulae that are not regressable. Its operation depends
crucially on knowing how many actions there are in each situation term, so that each action can be “unwound” from the
query in turn. Queries that universally quantify over situations, such as the property persistence queries of interest in this
paper, fall squarely outside the reach of standard regression techniques.
4.2. Inductive reasoning
While there is a rich and diverse literature base for the situation calculus, there appears to have been little work on
queries that universally quantify over situation terms. Reiter [24] has shown why the induction axiom cannot in general be
eliminated when proving such statements, demonstrating the use of the axiom in manual proofs but offering no automated
procedure.
Other work on universally-quantiﬁed queries focuses on highly specialised applications, such as verifying state constraints
[1,19] or studying properties of ConGolog programs [2,4,12]. While these works have produced useful results, they are
typically intended as stand-alone techniques rather than general reasoning tools for the situation calculus.
Pirri and Reiter [19] have shown that the induction axiom can be “compiled away” when verifying a state constraint, by
means of the following equivalence1:
D − DS0 | φ[S0] →
(∀s: S0 Poss s → φ[s])
iff
Dbg | ∀s,a: φ[s] ∧ RD
(
Poss(a, s)
)→ RD(φ[do(a, s)])
1 We have modiﬁed the original equations for consistency with our modiﬁed notation.
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Veriﬁcation of state constraints was also approached by Bertossi et al. [1], who develop an automatic constraint veriﬁcation
system using an induction theorem prover.
However, there are many issues that are not addressed by these highly specialised works. What if we are interested in
the future of some arbitrary situation σ , rather than only S0? What if we restrict future actions according to an arbitrary
action description predicate? Can we integrate a method for handling universally-quantiﬁed queries with existing regression
techniques? Our treatment of property persistence can provide a concrete basis for these considerations, and is hence
signiﬁcantly more general than this existing work.
Formulating various safety, liveness and starvation properties of ConGolog programs also requires universal quantiﬁcation
over situations. De Giacomo et al. [4] show how to re-cast these properties as ﬁxpoint queries in second-order logic, and
a preliminary model-checker capable of verifying them is described in [12]. Claßen and Lakemeyer [2] have developed a
logic of ConGolog programs based on an iterative ﬁxpoint computation similar to the one we propose in this paper. Their
technique is based on a modal variant of the situation calculus known as ES and is designed for quite speciﬁc applications;
by contrast, our approach aims to be a general-purpose reasoning tool for the classical situation calculus.
If one is willing to restrict attention to propositional domains, it is possible to use techniques from the propositional
mu-calculus to answer a broad range of inductive queries [11]. In a similar vein, Ternovska [31] has proven decidability for
a variant of the situation calculus with monadic ﬂuents. Our work differs by focusing on a narrower class of queries, by
constructing ﬁxpoints at the meta-level rather than in the language, and by its applicability to the full ﬁrst-order situation
calculus.
Finally, let us introduce an important property of situations ﬁrst formally identiﬁed by Savelli [28]: that universal quan-
tiﬁcation over situation terms is equivalent to a kind of inﬁnite conjunction over the levels of the tree of situations:
D | ∀s: ψ(s)
iff
D |
⋃
n∈N
{∀a1 . . .an: ψ(do([a1 . . .an], S0))}
This is a direct consequence of the induction axiom for situations, which restricts situations to be constructed by per-
forming some countable number of actions in the initial situation.
5. The persistence condition
To enable the use of persistence queries in practical systems, we clearly need a more effective reasoning technique
than open-ended second-order theorem proving. Our approach is inspired by the success of Reiter’s regression technique:
use a meta-level operator to transform the query into one that is easier to answer. Speciﬁcally, our technique transforms
a property persistence query at σ into the evaluation of a uniform formula at σ – a much simpler query which can be
approached using existing techniques.
Formally, we seek a method for transforming a uniform formula φ and action description predicate α into a uniform
formula PD(φ,α) that is true at precisely the situations in which φ persists under α. We call such a formula the persistence
condition of φ under α.
Deﬁnition 6 (Persistence condition). The persistence condition of φ under α, denoted PD(φ,α), is a uniform formula such
that:
D − DS0 | ∀s:
(PD(φ,α)[s] ≡ ∀s′: sα s′ → φ[s′])
In other words, PD(φ,α) holds at s iff φ persists under α at s.
Deﬁning PD to be independent of the initial world state allows it to be calculated regardless of what (if anything) is
known about the actual state of the world – after all, a situated agent may not know all the details of DS0 , and we still
want it to be able to use this technique.
Provided that such a formula PD(φ,α) is given, we can use standard regression to reduce reasoning about situation-
invariant properties to a ﬁrst-order reasoning task as follows:
D | ∀s: σ α s → φ[s]
iff
D | PD(φ,α)[σ ]
iff
DS0 ∪ Dbg | R∗
(PD(φ,α)[σ ])D
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∀s: S0 Poss s → φ[s].
Deﬁnition 6 alone clearly does not make the task of answering a persistence query any easier – it gives no indication of
how the persistence condition might be calculated in practice, or even whether such a formula actually exists for a given φ
and α. In order to establish these results, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne the weaker notion of a formula persisting to depth n in a
situation.
Deﬁnition 7 (Persistence to depth 1). A uniform formula φ persists to depth 1 under α in situation s when the formula
P1D(φ,α)[s] holds, as deﬁned by:
P1D(φ,α)[s] def= φ[s] ∧ ∀a: RD
(
α[a, s])→ RD(φ[do(a, s)])
Since α is an action description predicate and φ is a uniform formula, the expressions RD(α[a, s]) and RD(φ[do(a, s)])
are always deﬁned and the resulting formula is always uniform in s. Note that P1D is a literal encoding of the requirement
that “φ holds in s and in all its direct successors”.
Successive applications of P1D can then assert persistence to greater depths:
Deﬁnition 8 (Persistence to depth n). For any n 0, a uniform formula φ persists to depth n under α in situation s when the
formula PnD(φ,α)[s] holds, as deﬁned by:
P0D(φ,α)
def= φ
PnD(φ,α)
def= P1D
(Pn−1D (φ,α),α)
The following theorem conﬁrms that PnD operates according to this intuition – for any sequence of actions of length
i  n, if each action satisﬁes α when it is executed, then φ will hold after performing those actions.
Theorem 1. For any n ∈ N, PnD(φ,α) holds in σ iff φ holds in σ and in all successors of σ reached by performing at most n actions
satisfying α:
D | PnD(φ,α)[σ ] ≡
∧
in
∀a1 . . .ai:
(∧
ji
α
[
a j,do
([a1 . . .a j−1],σ )] → φ[do([a1 . . .ai],σ )]
)
Proof sketch. By induction on the natural numbers. For n = 0 we have φ[σ ] ≡ φ[σ ] by deﬁnition. For the inductive case,
we expand the deﬁnition of PnD(φ,α)[σ ] to get the following for the LHS:
Pn−1D (φ,α)[σ ] ∧ ∀a: RD
(
α[a,σ ])→ RD(Pn−1D (φ,α)[do(a,σ )])
Substituting for Pn−1D using the inductive hypothesis gives us a conjunction ranging over i  n − 1, with universally
quantiﬁed variables a1 . . .ai , and we must establish the i = n case. Pushing this conjunction inside the scope of the ∀a
quantiﬁer, we can rename a ⇒ a1, a1 ⇒ a2, etc. to get the required expression. For a detailed proof see Appendix A. 
The PnD operator thus allows us to express the persistence of a formula to any given depth using a simple syntactic
translation based on regression. Intuitively, one would expect PD(φ,α) to be some sort of ﬁxpoint of P1D(φ,α), since
PD(φ,α) must imply persistence up to any depth. Such a ﬁxpoint could then be calculated by iterative application of P1D .
The remainder of this section is devoted to verifying this intuition.
We begin with two straightforward generalisations of results from the situation calculus literature, adapting them to our
α notation:
Proposition 5. For any action description predicate α, the foundational axioms of the situation calculus entail the following induction
principle:
∀W , s: W (s) ∧ [∀a, s′: α[a, s′]∧ sα s′ ∧ W (s′)→ W (do(a, s′))]→ ∀s′: sα s′ → W (s′)
Proof. A trivial adaptation of Theorem 3.2 in [24]. 
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D − DS0 | ∀s: φ[s] →
(∀s′: sα s′ → φ[s′])
iff
Dbg | ∀s,a: φ[s] ∧ RD
(
α[a, s])→ RD(φ[do(a, s)])
Proof. A straightforward generalisation of the model-construction proof of Lemma 5.3 in [19], utilising Proposition 5. The
details of this proof are reproduced in Appendix A. 
Proposition 6 will be key in our algorithm for calculating the persistence condition. It allows one to establish the result
“if φ holds in s, then φ persists in s” by using static domain reasoning, a comparatively straightforward reasoning task.
We next formalise some basic relationships between our hypothetical PD operator and PnD:
Lemma 1. Given a basic action theory D, uniform formula φ and action description predicate α, then for any n:
D − DS0 | ∀s:
(∀s′: sα s′ → φ[s′])≡ (∀s′: sα s′ → PnD(φ,α)[s′])
That is, φ persists under α iff PnD[φ,α] persists under α.
Proof. Since PnD[φ,α] implies φ by deﬁnition, the if direction is trivial. For the only-if direction we proceed by induction
on n.
For the base case of P1D , let M be a model of D and μ an assignment to the free variables in φ. Suppose that φ persists
at s but P1D(φ,α) does not:
M,μ | ∀s′: sα s′ → φ
[
s′
]
(3)
M,μ | ∀s′: sα s′ → PnD(φ,α)
[
s′
]
(4)
For (4) to hold, there must be some situation element from M that is in the future of μ(s) but at which P1D(φ,α) is false.
Let μ assign this situation element to the fresh variable s˙, so that:
M,μ | sα s˙ ∧ ¬P1D(φ,α)[s˙]
Expanding the deﬁnition of P1D we have:
M,μ | sα s˙ ∧ ¬
(
φ[s˙] ∧ ∀a: α[a, s˙] → φ[do(a, s˙)]) (5)
But by our assumption that (3) holds, we must have:
M,μ | φ[s˙]
M,μ | ∀a: α[a, s˙] → φ[do(a, s˙)]
It is thus impossible for (5) to hold, and we have a contradiction. Since our choice of M and μ was arbitrary, the result
will hold for any s and we have the lemma as required.
For the inductive case, assume that Pn−1D (φ,α) persists but PnD(φ,α) does not. By deﬁnition we have PnD(φ,α) =
P1D(Pn−1D (φ,α),φ), and we repeat the base case proof using φ′ = Pn−1D (φ,α) in place of φ to obtain a contradiction. 
Lemma 2. Given a basic action theory D, uniform formula φ and action description predicate α, then for any n:
D − DS0 | ∀s:
(PD(φ,α)[s] → PnD(φ,α)[s])
Proof. PD(φ,α) implies the persistence of φ by deﬁnition. If φ persists at s, then by Lemma 1 we have that PnD(φ,α)
persists at s. Since the persistence of PnD(φ,α) at s implies that PnD(φ,α) holds at s by deﬁnition, we have the lemma as
desired. 
We are now equipped to prove the major theorem of this paper: that if PnD(φ,α) implies Pn+1D (φ,α), then PnD(φ,α) is
equivalent to the persistence condition for φ under α.
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Dbg | ∀s: PnD(φ,α)[s] → Pn+1D (φ,α)[s] (6)
iff
D − Ds0 | ∀s: PnD(φ,α)[s] ≡ PD(φ,α)[s] (7)
In other words, if we can calculate a ﬁxpoint of applications ofP1D(φ,α)[s] then that ﬁxpoint is the persistence condition for φ under α.
Proof. For the if direction, we begin by expanding Eq. (6) using the deﬁnition of P1D to get the equivalent form:
Dbg | ∀s: PnD(φ,α)[s] → P1D
(PnD(φ,α),α)[s]
Dbg | ∀s: PnD(φ,α)[s] →
(PnD(φ,α)[s] ∧ ∀a: RD(α[a, s])→ RD(P1D(φ,α)[do(a, s)]))
Dbg | ∀s,a: PnD(φ,α)[s] ∧ ∀a: RD
(
α[a, s])→ RD(P1D(φα)[do(a, s)])
By Proposition 6, Eq. (6) thus lets us conclude that PnD(φ,α) persists under α. By Lemma 1 this is equivalent to the
persistence of φ under α, which is equivalent to PD(φ,α) by deﬁnition, giving:
D − Ds0 | ∀s: PnD(φ,α)[s] → PD(φ,α)[s]
By Lemma 2 this is an equivalence, yielding Eq. (7) as required.
The only-if direction is a straightforward reversal of this reasoning process: PD(φ,α) implies the persistence of φ, which
implies the persistence of PnD(φ,α), which yields Eq. (6) by Proposition 6. 
Since Dbg | Pn+1D (φ,α) → PnD(φ,α) by deﬁnition, Eq. (6) identiﬁes PnD(φ,α) as a ﬁxpoint of the P1D operator, as our
initial intuition suggested. We can therefore apply some standard results from ﬁxpoint theory to the calculation of PD(φ,α),
which we will do in the next section.
To conclude this section, we establish what is essentially the “dual” of the theorem above – that is there is any uniform
formula satisfying the deﬁnition of PD(φ,α) then it is the ﬁxpoint of applications of P1D .2
Theorem 3. Given a basic action theory D, uniform formula φ and action description predicate α, suppose that ψ is a regressable
formula with s the only zero-arity term of sort situation and:
D − DS0 | ∀s: ψ(s) ≡ ∀s′: sα s′ → φ
[
s′
]
ψ(s) thus identiﬁes precisely those situations in which φ persists under α. Then for any situation term σ :
D | R∗D(ψ)[σ ]
iff
D |
⋃
n∈N
{PnD(φ,α)[σ ]}
In other words, R∗D(ψ) is a uniform formula representing the ﬁxpoint of applications of P1D(φ,α)[s].
Proof sketch. The restricted form of ψ means that it is “about” only the situation s and its successors, so we can apply
regression to transform it into a formula uniform in s. The theorem is then a straightforward adaptation of Lemma 6 in [28],
using Savelli’s technique of splitting the quantiﬁcation over situation terms into an inﬁnite conjunction. For a detailed proof
see Appendix A. 
6. CalculatingPD
Since we can easily calculate PnD(φ,α) for any n, we have a straightforward algorithm for determining PD(φ,α): search
for an n such that
Dbg | ∀s:
(PnD(φ,α)[s] → Pn+1D (φ,α)[s])
Since we expect PnD(φ,α) to be simpler than Pn+1D (φ,α), we should look for the smallest such n. Algorithm 1 presents an
iterative procedure for doing just that. Note that the calculation of P1D(φ,α) is a straightforward syntactic transformation,
so we do not present an algorithm for it.
2 Previous versions of this work [13,14] incorrectly claimed that such a formula would always exist. Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helping
to clarify this point.
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pn⇐ φ
pn1⇐ P1D(pn,α)
while Dbg | ∀s : pn[s] → pn1[s] do
pn⇐ pn1
pn1⇐ P1D[pn,α]
end while
return pn
6.1. Soundness
If Algorithm 1 terminates, it terminates returning a value of pn for which Eq. (6) holds. By Theorem 2 this value of pn is
equivalent to the persistence condition for φ under α. The algorithm therefore correctly calculates the persistence condition.
In particular, note that Eq. (6) holds when PnD(φ,α) is unsatisﬁable for any situation, as it appears in the antecedent of
an implication. The algorithm thus correctly returns an unsatisﬁable condition (equivalent to ⊥) when φ can never persist
under α.
6.2. Completeness
There are two aspects to the completeness of our technique: whether the necessary ﬁxpoint exists at all, and whether
the algorithm for calculating it will terminate in a ﬁnite number of iterations.
6.2.1. Existence of the persistence condition
By Theorem 3 we know that the persistence condition is always the ﬁxpoint of applications of P1D . In other words, if
P1D has no ﬁnitely-expressible ﬁxpoint for a given φ and α, then a uniform formula satisfying the deﬁnition of PD(φ,α)
does not exist.
Unfortunately, it is relatively easy to construct a ﬂuent for which a ﬁrst-order persistence condition does not exist.
Consider a domain with a single object sort modelled after the standard ﬁrst-order axioms for the natural numbers, a single
ﬂuent F (x, s) and a single action A that makes F (x, s) false whenever F (suc(x), s) is false:
F
(
x,do(A, s)
)≡ F (suc(x), s)
Let us attempt to calculate the persistence condition of F (0, s) with the action description predicate α set to true. The
sequence of iterations produced by Algorithm 1 would be:
P1D
(
F (0, s)
)≡ F (0, s) ∧ F (suc(0), s)
P2D
(
F (0, s)
)≡ F (0, s) ∧ F (suc(0), s)∧ F (suc(suc(0)), s)
...
PnD
(
F (0, s)
)≡ i=n∧
i=0
F
(
suci(0), s
)
It is straightforward to manually demonstrate that F (0, s) will persist if and only if F holds for all objects built by
successive applications of suc to 0. Such a condition can only be expressed using a transitive closure, and hence there is no
ﬁrst-order formula that is equivalent to the persistence condition of F (0, s).
Of course, if Dbg provides an axiomatisation of the standard “greater than” predicate x < y then we can ﬁnitely identify
these objects, and the persistence condition can be expressed as:
PD
(
F (0, s)
)≡ F (0, s) ∧ ∀x: 0 < x→ F (x, s)
However, calculating such a condition would still be beyond the reach of Algorithm 1; since it cannot be constructed by
ﬁnitely many applications of P1D , the algorithm would fail to terminate.
Nevertheless, Theorem 3 does provide an important completeness result – it demonstrates that if there exists any tech-
nique to replace reasoning about a persistence query at σ with a regression-based reasoning scheme at σ , then it is
equivalent (up to termination of the algorithm) to our approach.
In fact, we suspect that a stronger result than Theorem 3 holds: that if a persistence query at σ can be replaced by any
ﬁrst-order formula that does not universally quantify over situation terms, then that query has a well-deﬁned persistence
condition.
Conjecture 1. Given a basic action theory D, uniform formula φ and action description predicate α, suppose that ψ(s) is a sentence
of Lsitcalc whose prenex normal form contains only existential quantiﬁers over situations, with s the only free variable of sort situation,
such that:
R.F. Kelly, A.R. Pearce / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 865–888 877D − DS0 | ∀s: ψ(s) ≡ ∀s′: sα s′ → φ
[
s′
]
Thus ψ(s) identiﬁes precisely those situations in which φ persists under α. Then there is a uniform formula PD(φ,α) such that:
D | ∀s: ψ(s) ≡ PD(φ,α)[s]
In other words: if the domain D permits some technique for transforming a persistence query into a query that doesn’t
universally quantify over situations, then D is also amenable to the technique presented in this paper.
The proof from Theorem 3 cannot be applied to this conjecture because we have no way to reduce this more general ψ(s)
to a uniform formula. As part of our ongoing research, we aim to either conﬁrm this intuition or to ﬁnd a counter-example
– either result would shed valuable light on the study of universally-quantiﬁed queries in the situation calculus.
6.2.2. Termination
As shown in the previous section, even if the persistence condition PD(φ,α) is known to exist there is no guarantee that
Algorithm 1 can calculate it in a ﬁnite amount of time. The algorithm may in fact fail to terminate for two distinct reasons:
the loop condition may never be satisﬁed, or the ﬁrst-order logical inference in the loop condition may be undecidable.
The later case indicates that the background theory Dbg is undecidable. While this is a concern, it affects more than just
our algorithm – any system implemented around such an action theory will be incomplete. With respect to this source of
incompleteness, our algorithm is no more incomplete than any larger reasoning system it would form a part of. We will
concern ourselves only with the former case.
To ensure the completeness of our approach, we must restrict the domain theory and/or the form of queries being posed
so that PD(φ,α) is not only guaranteed to exist, but is guaranteed to be calculable within a ﬁnite number of iterations.
Some standard results from ﬁxpoint theory can be applied towards this task:
Deﬁnition 9. Let L(Dbg) be the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra of the background theory for formulae uniform in s. It is thus a
boolean lattice where:
• elements are sets of uniform formulae grouped by equivalence w.r.t. Dbg ,
• meet and join are ∧ and ∨ respectively,
• logical implication w.r.t. Dbg forms a partial ordering relation, and
• top and bottom are the equivalence classes of  and ⊥ respectively.
Theorem 4. For any ﬁxed value of α, P1D(φ,α)[s] is a monotone decreasing function over L(Dbg).
Proof. The domain and range of P1D are uniform formulae and so correspond to the elements of L(Dbg). By the deﬁnition
of P1D it is always the case that Dbg | P1D(φ,α) → φ. Since → is the partial ordering relation of L(Dbg), P1D is a monotone
decreasing function as required. 
Corollary 1. If L(Dbg) is a complete lattice, then given a uniform formula φ and action description predicate α, the persistence condi-
tion PD(φ,α) always exists and is unique up to equivalence under Dbg .
Proof. A standard result from ﬁxpoint theory. Since P1D is a monotone decreasing function over a complete lattice, the con-
structive proof of Tarski’s ﬁxpoint theorem [3] means it has a unique greatest ﬁxpoint less than the equivalence class of φ.
This ﬁxpoint can be found by transﬁnite iteration of applications of P1D and is equivalent to PD(φ,α) by Theorem 2. 
Corollary 2. If L(Dbg) is a well-founded lattice, then given a uniform formula φ and action description predicate α, the persistence
condition PD(φ,α) always exists and can be calculated by ﬁnitely many applications of P1D .
Proof. A standard result from ﬁxpoint theory. A well-founded lattice L(Dbg) as no inﬁnite descending chains of elements,
so the transﬁnite iteration used by [3] to ﬁnd the ﬁxpoint of P1D in Corollary 1 must terminate after ﬁnitely many itera-
tions. 
6.3. Guaranteeing completeness
The most obvious restriction that can be applied to guarantee completeness is to ensure that the action and object
sorts are ﬁnite. In such theories the lattice L(Dbg) is ﬁnite, and any ﬁnite lattice is both complete and well-founded. These
theories also have the advantage that the static domain reasoning performed by Algorithm 1 can be done using propositional
logic, meaning it is decidable and so providing a strong termination guarantee.
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propositionalised – for example, the use of quantiﬁers can produce exponentially-shorter formulae and hence lead to shorter
proofs.
An alternate approach is to restrict the form of the successor state axioms and/or the queries being posed so that
applications of P1D operate on a subset of L(Dbg) which meets the requirements set out in Corollaries 1 and 2.
For example, suppose we restrict successor state axioms and action description predicates to the following forms, where
y¯i ⊆ x¯ and Φ+/−F ,i and Πα,i mention no terms other than x¯ and s:
F
(
x¯,do(a, s)
)≡ n∨
i=1
a = ai( y¯i) ∧ Φ+F ,i(x¯, s) ∨ F (x¯, s) ∧ ¬
n∨
i=1
a = ai( y¯i) ∧ Φ−F ,i
α(x¯,a, s) ≡
n∨
i=1
a = ai( y¯i) ∧ Πα,i(x¯, s)
Such domains have a ﬁnite number of actions, each of which is only capable of changing ﬂuents about objects it is given
as direct arguments. For example, the action ai(A) can change the ﬂuent F (A, s) but not F (B, s).
Now, suppose we have a quantiﬁer free uniform formula φ. When calculating P1D(φ,α) it is possible to simplify away
the action terms introduced by the successor state axioms, so that P1D(φ,α) is also a quantiﬁer-free uniform formula
mentioning only the terms found in φ. The range of P1D applied to φ is thus a ﬁnite subset of L(Dbg), which ensures a
terminating calculation of PD(φ,α). A detailed proof appears in Appendix A (Theorem 5).
This restriction is similar to the local-effect theories of [21,35], with the additional requirement that the right-hand side
of the axiom contain no quantiﬁers. Whether local-effect theories can guarantee termination without additional restrictions
would be an interesting avenue for further research.
As an example, the classic “holding” predicate can be expressed in a form that meets this restriction:
Holding
(
obj,do(a, s)
)≡ a = pickup(obj) ∨ Holding(obj, s) ∧ a = drop(obj)
Poss
(
pickup(obj), s
)≡ ¬Holding(obj, s)
Poss
(
drop(obj), s
)≡ Holding(obj, s)
However, if there are multiple agents acting in the domain then the possibility predicate for pickup would no longer
meet this restriction, as it contains a quantiﬁer on the right-hand side:
Poss
(
pickup(agt,obj), s
)≡ ¬∃agt′: Holding(agt′,obj, s)
Clearly this is a strong restriction on the structure of the theory, as the successor state axioms are not able to contain
any quantiﬁers. It does demonstrate, however, that certain syntactic restrictions on D are able to guarantee terminating
calculation of PD . It seems there should be a more general “syntactic well-foundedness” restriction that can be applied to
these axioms, but we have not successfully formulated one at this stage.
In a similar vein, suppose that the theory of action is context free [20]. In such theories successor state axioms have the
following form:
F
(
x¯,do(a, s)
)≡ Φ+F (x¯,a) ∨ (F (x¯, s) ∧ ¬Φ−F (x¯,a))
The effects of an action are thus independent of the situation in which it is performed. Lin and Levesque [18, Lemma 6.2]
have show that context-free theories with a ﬁnite number of parameterless actions have a ﬁnite state space, which is
suﬃcient to ensure termination of our algorithm.
Intuitively, if there are at most N distinct states in the domain then any situation more than N actions into the future
has the same state as some situation less than N actions into the future. Algorithm 1 will therefore terminate after at most
N iterations. A detailed proof is available in Appendix A (Theorem 6).
From a slightly different perspective, suppose that φ can never persist under α, so that PD(φ,α) ≡ ⊥. Further suppose
that D has the compactness property as in standard ﬁrst-order logic. Then the “quantum levels” of Savelli [28] guarantee that
there is a ﬁxed, ﬁnite number of actions within which ¬φ can always be achieved. In this case Algorithm 1 will determine
PD(φ,α) ≡ ⊥ within ﬁnitely many iterations.
It would also be interesting to determine whether known variants of the situation calculus in which the projection
problem is decidable (such as [10]) are able to guarantee termination of the ﬁxpoint construction, or whether more sophis-
ticated ﬁxpoint algorithms can be applied instead of simple iterative approximation. Investigating such algorithms would be
a promising avenue for future research.
The important point here is not that we can guarantee termination in general, but that we have precisely characterised
the inductive reasoning necessary to answer property persistence queries, and shown how it can be replaced by the evalu-
ation of a uniform formula at the situation in question.
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Our algorithm replaces a single reasoning task based on the full action theory D with a series of reasoning tasks based
on the static background theory Dbg . Is this a worthwhile trade-off in practice? The following points weigh strongly in
favour of our approach.
First and foremost, we avoid the need for the second-order induction axiom. All the reasoning tasks can be performed
using standard ﬁrst-order reasoning, for which there are high-quality automated provers. Second, the calculation of PD
performs only static reasoning, which as discussed in Section 2 is a comparatively straightforward task which can be made
decidable under certain conditions. Third, PD(φ,α)[σ ] is in a form amenable to regression, a standard tool for effective
reasoning in the situation calculus. Fourth, the persistence condition for a given φ and α can be cached and re-used for a
series of related queries about different situations, a signiﬁcant gain in amortised eﬃciency. Finally, in realistic domains we
expect many properties to fail to persist beyond a few situations into the future, meaning that our algorithm will require
few iterations in a large number of cases.
Of course, we also inherit the potential disadvantage of the regression operator: the length of PD(φ,α) may be much
larger than the length of φ. Since there is no bound on the number of iterations required for Algorithm 1 to terminate, the
length of PD(φ,α) is actually unbounded in the general case. As with regression, our experience has been that this is rarely
a problem in practice, and is more than compensated for by the reduced complexity of the resulting reasoning task.
6.5. Related algorithms
As noted in Section 2, our use of ﬁxpoints in this paper has much in common with the study of properties of ConGolog
programs [2,4]. In particular, our algorithm has deep similarities to the CheckEU and CheckEG algorithms used by Claßen
and Lakemeyer [2]. Like our work, they seek a ﬁxpoint using iterative application of a meta-level function based on regres-
sion. Indeed, Algorithm 1 could be re-cast as a special case of their approach, but without the need to maintain a complex
graph structure.
Claßen and Lakemeyer also note that their approach is not able to guarantee completeness in the general case, and
they identify as future work the discovery of general classes of theory for which their technique is complete. Given the
underlying similarities, we are conﬁdent that such advances in reasoning about ConGolog programs will advance our ability
to answer persistence queries, and vice-versa.
We also note that work on state invariants in other planning formalisms (e.g. [7,8]) uses ideas broadly similar to our
approach – an iterative algorithm that explores longer and longer sequences of actions until a stable state is reached. In
these formalisms, the domain typically has a ﬁniteness restriction that guarantees eventual termination of the algorithm.
7. Examples
To demonstrate the applicability of our technique, consider again the example persistence queries given in Section 3.
The persistence condition is readily applicable to each example, and the transformed queries can then be answered using
standard regression.
Goal impossibility. Given a goal G , establish that there is no legal situation in which that goal is satisﬁed:
D | PD(¬G,Poss)[S0]
The persistence condition of ¬G with respect to action legality allows goal impossibility to be checked easily.
Goal futility. Given a goal G and situation σ , establish that the goal cannot be satisﬁed in any legal future situation from σ :
D | PD(¬G,Poss)[σ ]
Precisely the same formula is required for checking goal impossibility and goal futility. This highlights the advantage of re-
using the persistence condition at multiple situations. Our approach makes it feasible for an agent to check for goal futility
each time it considers performing an action, and avoid situations that would make its goals unachievable.
Checking state constraints. Given a state constraint SC, show that the constraint holds in every legal situation:
D | PD(SC,Poss)[S0]
However, since we want a state constraint to always persist, it must satisfy the following equivalence:
Dbg | φ ≡ PD(φ,Poss)
If this equivalence does not hold then PD(φ,Poss) indicates the additional conditions that are necessary to ensure that φ
persists, which may be useful for adjusting the action theory to enforce the constraint. This particular application has strong
parallels to the approach to state constraints developed by Lin and Reiter [19].
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agent only can achieve the goal:
D | PD(¬G,MyAction)[σ ]
Knowledge with hidden actions. In recent work we have developed a regression rule for knowledge that uses the persis-
tence condition to account for arbitrarily-long sequences of hidden actions [14]. While the details of this formulation are
outside the scope of the current paper, the general form of the regression rule is:
RD
(
Knows
(
φ,do(a, s)
)) def= Knows(RD(PD(φ,Hidden)[do(a, s)]), s)
The key point of this deﬁnition is that the agent can only know φ if it knows that φ will persist after any sequence of
hidden actions.
This highlights an important beneﬁt of our approach – it integrates well with existing reasoning techniques. If one is
willing to assume that PD(φ,α) will always exist, it can be used to “factor out” the inductive reasoning and produce a
regression rule for formulae that universally quantify over situations.
The “gold thief” domain. As a detailed example of our technique in action, consider again the “gold thief” domain as
described in Section 3 and axiomatised in Appendix B. We want to establish that:
D | ∀s: S0 Undet s → ¬Stolen(s)
By the deﬁnition of the persistence condition, this is equivalent to:
D | PD(¬Stolen,Undet)[σ ]
To answer this query we will employ Algorithm 1, calculating PnD for successively larger values of n until the series
converges to a ﬁxpoint. Full details of this calculation can be found in Appendix C; we present only the major results below.
The case of n = 0 is trivial:
P0D(¬Stolen,Undet)[s] = ¬Stolen(s)
The n = 1 case is given by Deﬁnition 7 as:
P1D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧ ∀a: RD
(
Undet(a, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(a, s)))
Expanding the ∀a quantiﬁer over each of the three actions in this domain we obtain:
P1D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧ RD
(
Undet(takeGold, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(takeGold, s)))
∧ RD
(
Undet(crackSafe, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(crackSafe, s)))
∧ RD
(
Undet(toggleLight, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(toggleLight, s)))
Applying regression and simplifying produces the ﬁnal result:
P1D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧
[¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ LightOn(s)]
Intuitively, this indicates that the gold cannot be stolen by a single undetected action if the safe is not open (since it
would ﬁrst have to be cracked) or the light is on (since the action would be detected). Since this is clearly not entailed by
the P0D case, we must continue to the n = 2 case. Again applying Deﬁnition 7 and expanding out each individual action, we
get:
P2D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧
[¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ LightOn(s)]
∧ RD
(
Undet(takeGold, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(takeGold, s))
∧ [¬SafeOpen(do(takeGold, s))∨ LightOn(do(takeGold, s))])
∧ RD
(
Undet(crackSafe, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(crackSafe, s))
∧ [¬SafeOpen(do(crackSafe, s))∨ LightOn(do(crackSafe, s))])
∧ RD
(
Undet(toggleLight, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(toggleLight, s))
∧ [¬SafeOpen(do(toggleLight(s))∨ LightOn(do(toggleLight, s))])
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P2D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧
[¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ LightOn(s)]
We have clearly satisﬁed the termination condition of Algorithm 1, since P1D → P2D , and have thus successfully calcu-
lated the persistence condition:
PD(¬Stolen,Undet) = ¬Stolen∧ [¬SafeOpen∨ LightOn]
Checking whether the gold is safe is now a simple matter of reasoning about the initial situation:
D | ¬Stolen(S0) ∧
[¬SafeOpen(S0) ∨ LightOn(S0)]
With PD(¬Stolen,Undet) in hand, we can also perform more sophisticated reasoning about the safety of the gold – for
example, we can check whether a proposed action would jeopardise the safety of the gold and refuse to perform the action
if so.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed an algorithm that transforms property persistence queries, a quite general and useful
class of situation calculus query, into a form that is amenable to standard techniques for effective reasoning in the situation
calculus. The algorithm replaces a second-order induction axiom with a meta-level ﬁxpoint calculation based on iterative
application of the standard regression operator. It is shown to be sound, and complete in several interesting cases.
Our approach generalises previous work on universally-quantiﬁed queries in several important ways. It can consider
sequences of actions satisfying a range of conditions, not just the standard ordering over action possibility, enabling us to
treat problems such as need for cooperation and knowledge with hidden actions. It can establish that properties persist in
the future of an arbitrary situation, not necessarily the initial situation, enabling us to answer the question of goal futility.
The results of calculating the persistence condition can be cached, allowing for example the goal futility question to be
eﬃciently posed on a large number of situations once the persistence condition has been calculated.
Perhaps most importantly for the wider situation calculus community, we have factored out the inductive reasoning re-
quired to answer these queries. Work on increasing the effectiveness of this inductive reasoning, and on guaranteeing a
terminating calculation in stronger classes of action theory, can proceed independently from the development of formalisms
that utilise persistence queries. This opens the possibility of wider application of the property persistence approach – sub-
sequent applications can use the PD operator as a kind of “black box” for dealing with persistence queries, for example to
formulate regression rules as in our own work on knowledge [14].
This paper has thus signiﬁcantly increased the scope of queries that can be posed within automated reasoning systems
built upon the situation calculus.
Appendix A. Detailed proofs
Theorem 1. For any n ∈ N, PnD(φ,α) holds in σ iff φ holds in σ and in all successors of σ reached by performing at most n actions
satisfying α:
D | PnD(φ,α)[σ ] ≡∧
in
∀a1 . . .ai:
(∧
ji
α
[
a j,do
([a1 . . .a j−1],σ )] → φ[do([a1 . . .ai],σ )]
)
Proof. By induction on the natural numbers. For n = 0 we have φ[σ ] ≡ φ[σ ] by deﬁnition. For the inductive case, we
expand the deﬁnition of PnD(φ,α)[σ ] to get the following for the LHS:
Pn−1D (φ,α)[σ ] ∧ ∀a: RD
(
α[a,σ ])→ RD(Pn−1D (φ,α)[do(a,σ )])
By the inductive hypothesis we can equate Pn−1D (φ,α)[σ ] in this LHS with all but the i = n clause from the RHS con-
junction, and we suppress them on both sides. If we also drop the regression operators we are left with the following to
establish:
D | ∀a: α[a,σ ] → Pn−1D (φ,α)
[
do(a,σ )
]≡
∀a1 . . .an:
(∧
α
[
a j,do
([a1 . . .a j−1],σ )] → φ[do([a1 . . .an],σ )]
)jn
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implication over the outermost conjunction and collect quantiﬁers, we obtain the following for the LHS:∧
in−1
∀a,a1 . . .ai:
(
α[a,σ ] ∧
∧
ji
α
[
a j,do
([a,a1 . . .a j−1],σ )]→ φ[do([a,a1 . . .ai],σ )]
)
Renaming a ⇒ a1, a1 ⇒ a2, . . . ,ai ⇒ ai+1, we see that each of the i < n − 1 clauses on the LHS is equivalent to one of
the i < n clauses that have been suppressed on the RHS. The remaining i = n− 1 clause is equivalent to the required RHS:
∀a1 . . .an:
(∧
jn
α
[
a j,do
([a1 . . .a j−1],σ )] → φ[do([a1 . . .an],σ )]
)
We therefore have the desired equivalence. 
Lemma 3. For any basic action theory D, uniform formula φ and action description predicate α:
if
Σ ∪ Dbg ∪ Dssa ∪ Dad ∪
{
φ[S0]
} | ∀s: S0 α s → φ[s]
then
Dbg | ∀s,a: φ[s] ∧ RD
(
α[a, s])→ RD(φ[do(a, s)])
Proof. This is a straightforward generalisation of the proof of Lemma 5.3 in [19] using our modiﬁed notation. We repeat
the details of the proof below for convenience. Begin by assuming the antecedent:
Σ ∪ Dbg ∪ Dssa ∪ Dad ∪
{
φ[S0]
} | ∀s: S0 α s → φ[s] (A.1)
Let M be a model of Dbg . Suppose μs and μa are variable assignments for situation and action variables respectively, such
that:
M,μs,μa | φ[s] ∧ RD
(
α[a, s])
We will show that M,μs,μa | RD(φ[do(a, s)]). Following the construction in [23], we construct a model M′ with the
following properties:
1. M′ and M share the same domains for sorts Action and Object.
2. M′ interprets every rigid predicate and function the same as M .
3. M′ | Σ ∪ Dssa ∪ Dad .
4. For every variable assignment for object variables μo , and for every ﬂuent F (x¯, s), M′,μo | F (x¯, S0) iff M,μs,μo |
F (x¯, s).
Since M,μs,μa | RD(α[a, s]) and M′ | Dad we have:
M′,μa | α[a, S0]
Since M,μs,μa | φ[s], property (4) of M′ ensures that:
M′,μa | φ[S0]
By our assumption (A.1), M′,μa | φ[do(a, S0)]. Since M′ satisﬁes Dssa the regression operator can be employed to
yield:
M′,μa | RD
(
φ
[
do(a, S0)
])
Finally, property (4) of M′ gives us:
M′,μa | RD
(
φ
[
do(a, S0)
])
iff M,μs,μa | RD
(
φ
[
do(a, s)
])
Since we have the LHS of this equivalence by construction, we can conclude the RHS. This suﬃces to establish the
lemma. 
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D − DS0 | ∀s: φ[s] →
(∀s′: sα s′ → φ[s′])
iff
Dbg | ∀s,a: φ[s] ∧ RD
(
α[a, s])→ RD(φ[do(a, s)])
Proof. The if direction is straightforward using the induction axiom from Proposition 5. For the only-if direction, we can
take the S0 case of the LHS to obtain:
D − DS0 | φ[S0] →
(∀s: S0 α s → φ[s])
Lifting φ[S0] into the axioms, this precisely matches the form of Lemma 3 and we have the theorem as desired. 
Theorem 3. Given a basic action theory D, uniform formula φ and action description predicate α, suppose that ψ is a regressable
formula with s the only zero-arity term of sort situation and:
D − DS0 | ∀s: ψ(s) ≡ ∀s′: sα s′ → φ
[
s′
]
ψ(s) thus identiﬁes precisely those situations in which φ persists under α. Then for any situation term σ :
D | R∗D(ψ)[σ ]
iff
D |
⋃
n∈N
{PnD(φ,α)[σ ]}
In other words, R∗D(ψ) is a uniform formula representing the ﬁxpoint of applications of P1D(φ,α)[s].
Proof. The restrictions on ψ mean it is a regressable formula containing only situations of the form s and do([a1 . . .ai], s).
R∗D(ψ) can therefore unwind these action terms and produce an equivalent formula uniform in s.
Let M be a model of D − DS0 and μ an assignment to the free variables in φ. Adopting the technique used by Savelli
in [28, Lemma 6], we can split the quantiﬁcation over s′ into a kind of inﬁnite conjunction over the levels of the tree of
situations:
M,μ | ∀s′: sα s′ → φ
[
s′
]
iff
M,μ |
⋃
n∈N
{
∀a1 . . .an:
n∧
i=1
α
(
ai,do
([a1 . . .ai−1], s))→ φ[do([a1 . . .an], s)]
}
(A.2)
Note that each element of the set (A.2) is a statement about all situations n actions into the future of s. Moreover, each
element can be regressed to give a formula uniform in s.
Now take the ﬁnite subset of (A.2) for n up to any natural number m. Clearly such a subset can be written as a ﬁnite
conjunction:
M,μ |
⋃
nm
{
∀a1 . . .an:
n∧
i=1
α
(
ai,do
([a1 . . .ai−1], s))→ φ[do([a1 . . .an], s)]
}
iff
M,μ |
∧
nm
∀a1 . . .an:
n∧
i=1
α
(
ai,do
([a1 . . .ai−1], s))→ φ[do([a1 . . .an], s)] (A.3)
Eq. (A.3) precisely matches the form of the RHS of the equivalence in Theorem 1, so we can substitute to LHS to give:
M,μ |
⋃
nm
{
∀a1 . . .an:
n∧
i=1
α
(
ai,do
([a1 . . .ai−1], s))→ φ[do([a1 . . .an], s)]
}
iff
M,μ | PmD(φ,α)[s]
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M,μ |
⋃
nm
{
∀a1 . . .an:
n∧
i=1
α
(
ai,do
([a1 . . .ai−1], s))→ φ[do([a1 . . .an], s)]
}
iff
M,μ |
⋃
nm
{PnD(φ,α)[s]}
Noting that this construction works for any M, μ and m ∈N gives the theorem as required. 
Theorem 5. Let D be such that all successor state axioms and action description predicates take the following restricted forms, where
y¯i ⊆ x¯ and Φ+/−F ,i and Πα,i mention no terms other than x¯ and s:
F
(
x¯,do(a, s)
)≡ n∨
i=1
a = ai( y¯i) ∧ Φ+F ,i(x¯, s) ∨ F (x¯, s) ∧ ¬
n∨
i=1
a = ai( y¯i) ∧ Φ−F ,i
α(x¯,a, s) ≡
n∨
i=1
a = ai( y¯i) ∧ Πα,i x¯, s)
Then for a quantiﬁer-free uniform formula φ and any α, the persistence condition PD(φ,α) exists and can be calculated in ﬁnitely
many iterations.
Proof. We will treat only the case where φ = F (x¯, s); the general case follows by induction on the structure of φ. Calculating
P1D(F (x¯, s),α) gives:
P1D
(
F (x¯, s),α
)= F (x¯, s) ∧ ∀a:
(
n∨
i=1
a = ai( y¯i) ∧ Πα,i(x¯, s)
)
→
(
n∨
j=1
a = a j( y¯ j) ∧ Φ+F ,i(x¯, s) ∨ F (x¯, s) ∧ ¬
n∨
j=1
a = a j( y¯ j) ∧ Φ−F ,i
)
If we take the i-disjunction outside the implication, it becomes a conjunction over action types:
P1D
(
F (x¯, s),α
)= F (x¯, s) ∧ ∀a: n∧
i=1
(
a = ai( y¯i) ∧ Πα,i(x¯, s) →
n∨
i=1
a = ai( y¯i) ∧ Φ+F ,i(x¯, s) ∨ F (x¯, s) ∧ ¬
n∨
i=1
a = ai( y¯i) ∧ Φ−F ,i
)
This allows us to remove the quantiﬁcation over a and eliminate the explicit references to ai to produce:
P1D
(
F (x¯, s)α
)= F (x¯, s) ∧ n∧
i=1
(
Πα,i(x¯, s) → Φ+F ,i(x¯, s) ∨ F (x¯, s) ∧ ¬Φ−F ,i
)
Let terms(φ) denote the set of all terms mentioned in φ:
terms
(
F (τ¯ , σ )
) def= τ¯ ∪ {σ }
terms(τi = τ j) def= (τi, τ j)
terms(φi ∧ φ j) def= terms(φi) ∪ terms(φ j)
terms(¬φ) def= terms(φ)
Recall that Φ+/−F ,i and Πα,i mention no terms other than x¯ and s, so:
terms
(
F (x¯, s)
)= terms(P1D(F (x¯, s),α))
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terms
(
F (x¯, s)
)= terms(PnD(F (x¯, s),α))
Since terms(F (x¯, s)) is ﬁnite, it follows that applications of P1D to F (x¯, s) can only generate ﬁnitely many non-equiv-
alent formulae. P1D thus operates over a ﬁnite subset of L(Dbg), which suﬃces to ensure the terminating calculation ofPD(F (x¯, s),α). 
Theorem 6. Let D be a context-free domain with ﬁnitely many parameterless actions, then for any φ and α the persistence condition
PD(φ,α) exists and can be calculated in ﬁnitely many iterations.
Proof. Following the notation used in [18], say that two situations have the same state if they satisfy precisely the same
ﬂuents:
SameState
(
s, s′
) def= n∧
i=1
(∀x¯i : Fi(x¯i, s) ≡ Fi(x¯i, s′))
Observe that such situations also satisfy the same uniform formulae:
D | SameState(s, s′)→ (φ[s] ≡ φ[s′])
Let ‖do(ξ, S0)‖ be the set of all situations that have the same state as do(ξ, S0) for a given sequence of actions ξ . By
[18, Lemma 6.1] there are at most N distinct sets ‖do(ξ, S0)‖ for some natural number N .
We show that Algorithm 1 terminates after at most N iterations. Suppose otherwise, i.e. suppose that there is a model
M of D and a variable assignment μ such that:
M,μ | PND(φ,α)[s]
M,μ | ¬PN+1D (φ,α)[s] (A.4)
Then there must exist a sequence of actions [A1 . . . AN+1] such that:
M,μ | ¬φ[do([A1 . . . AN+1], s)] (A.5)
We will show that such a sequence cannot exist. First, assume that ‖do([A1 . . . Ai], s)‖ is distinct for each i  N . Since
there are at most N such distinct states in the domain, ‖do([A1 . . . AN+1)‖ must be the same as ‖do([A1 . . . Ai], s)‖ for
some i. By (A.4) we have that φ[do([A1 . . . Ai], s)] for any i  N , and so (A.5) cannot hold.
Alternately, assume that there is some i < j  N such that:
M,μ | SameState(do([A1 . . . Ai], s),do([A1 . . . A j], s))
Then we can remove the redundant actions between i and j to get:
M,μ | SameState(do([A1 . . . Ai, A j+1 . . . AN+1], s),do([A1 . . . AN+1], s))
By (A.4) we know that φ holds at do([A1 . . . Ai, A j+1 . . . AN+1]), so (A.5) cannot hold and we have the desired contradic-
tion.
There can therefore be no such model M, and persistence to depth N suﬃces to establish persistence to any depth. 
Appendix B. Axioms for the “gold thief” domain
This section gives the axioms used for the “gold thief” example domain in Sections 3 and 7. In this domain a thief may
try to steal some gold from a safe. There is a light in the room, and a security camera that will detect the thief’s actions as
long as the light is on. The safe can be open or closed, but the gold can only be stolen if the safe is open. It is possible for
the thief to crack the safe and force it open, but only if the light is on.
The actions in this domain are takeGold, crackSafe and toggleLight, the primitive ﬂuents are SafeOpen, LightOn and Stolen,
and the action description predicates include the standard Poss(a, s) and a custom predicate Undet(a, s) indicating that
action a would not be detected by the security camera.
The successor state axioms Dssa consist of the following sentences:
Stolen
(
do(a, s)
)≡ a = takeGold∨ Stolen(s)
SafeOpen
(
do(a, s)
)≡ a = crackSafe∨ SafeOpen(s)
LightOn
(
do(a, s)
)≡ a = toggleLight ∧ ¬LightOn(s) ∨ LightOn(s) ∧ a = toggleLight
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Poss(a, s) ≡ a = toggleLight ∨ a = takeGold∧ SafeOpen(s) ∨ a = crackSafe∧ LightOn(s)
Undet(a, s) ≡ Poss(a, s) ∧ a = toggleLight ∧ ¬LightOn(s)
The background theory Dbg contains only the standard unique names assumptions for actions, and the initial situation
axioms DS0 are not speciﬁed since they are not used in the discussion.
Appendix C. Complete calculation for the “gold thief” domain
This section presents complete details of the calculation of PD for the “gold thief” example as outlined in Section 7. We
need to calculate:
PD(¬Stolen,Undet)[σ ]
To calculate this persistence condition we follow Algorithm 1, calculating PnD for successively larger values of n until the
series converges to a ﬁxpoint. The case of n = 0 is trivial:
P0D(¬Stolen,Undet)[s] = ¬Stolen(s)
The n = 1 case is given by Deﬁnition 7 as:
P1D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧ ∀a: RD
(
Undet(a, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(a, s)))
Some straightforward simpliﬁcations can be applied at this stage. First, since there are ﬁnitely many actions in this
domain, the ∀a quantiﬁcation can be replaced with a ﬁnite conjunction:
P1D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s)
∧ RD
(
Undet(takeGold, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(takeGold, s)))
∧ RD
(
Undet(crackSafe, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(crackSafe, s)))
∧ RD
(
Undet(toggleLight, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(toggleLight, s)))
From the domain axioms we know that crackSafe and toggleLight do not affect whether the gold has been stolen, while
takeGold will always make Stolen true. Performing the regression of ¬Stolen we thus obtain the following result:
P1D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧ RD
(
Undet(takeGold, s)
)→ ¬
∧ RD
(
Undet(crackSafe, s)
)→ ¬Stolen(s)
∧ RD
(
Undet(toggleCam, s)
)→ ¬Stolen(s)
Since the conjunction already contains ¬Stolen(s) unconditionally, we can simplify away the ﬁnal three cases. We obtain:
P1D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧ ¬RD
(
Undet(takeGold, s)
)
Performing the remaining regression, we obtain the ﬁnal result for P1D:
P1D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧
[¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ LightOn(s)]
Since this is clearly not entailed by the P0D case, we must continue to the n = 2 case. Again applying Deﬁnition 7 and
expanding out each individual action, we get:
P2D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧
[¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ LightOn(s)]
∧ RD
(
Undet(takeGold, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(takeGold, s))
∧ [¬SafeOpen(do(takeGold, s))∨ LightOn(do(takeGold, s))])
∧ RD
(
Undet(crackSafe, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(crackSafe, s))
∧ [¬SafeOpen(do(crackSafe, s))∨ LightOn(do(crackSafe, s))])
∧ RD
(
Undet(toggleLight, s)
)→ RD(¬Stolen(do(toggleLight, s))
∧ [¬SafeOpen(do(toggleLight(s))∨ LightOn(do(toggleLight, s))])
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P2D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧
[¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ LightOn(s)]
∧ RD
(
Undet(takeGold, s)
)→ ¬ ∧ [¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ LightOn(s)]
∧ RD
(
Undet(crackSafe, s)
)→ ¬Stolen(s) ∧ [¬ ∨ LightOn(s)]
∧ RD
(
Undet(toggleLight, s)
)→ ¬Stolen(s) ∧ [¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ ¬LightOn(s)]
Further simplifying:
P2D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧
[¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ LightOn(s)]∧ ¬RD(Undet(takeGold, s))
∧ [¬RD(Undet(toggleLight, s))∨ ¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ ¬LightOn(s)]
Now performing the second regression:
P2D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧
[¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ LightOn(s)]∧ [¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ LightOn(s)]
∧ [¬⊥ ∨ ¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ ¬LightOn(s)]
Further simpliﬁcation gives:
P2D(. . .)[s] = ¬Stolen(s) ∧
[¬SafeOpen(s) ∨ LightOn(s)]
We have clearly satisﬁed the termination condition of Algorithm 1, since P1D → P2D . We have thus successfully calculated
the persistence condition:
PD(¬Stolen,Undet) = ¬Stolen∧ [¬SafeOpen∨ LightOn]
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